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BI-INTERPRETATION IN WEAK SET THEORIES
ALFREDO ROQUE FREIRE AND JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
Abstract. In contrast to the robust mutual interpretability phenomenon in
set theory, Ali Enayat proved that bi-interpretation is absent: distinct theories
extending ZF are never bi-interpretable and models of ZF are bi-interpretable
only when they are isomorphic. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theo-
ries, we prove, including Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC− without power set
and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation.
Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC− that are bi-interpretable,
but not isomorphic—even 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 can be bi-interpretable—and
there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC−. Similarly, using
a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable
with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails.
1. Introduction
Set theory exhibits a robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in a given
model of set theory, we can define diverse other interpreted models of set theory.
In any model of Zermelo-Fraenkel ZF set theory, for example, we can define an
interpreted model of ZFC+GCH, via the constructible universe, as well as definable
interpreted models of ZF+¬AC, of ZFC+MA+¬CH, of ZFC+b < d, and so on for
infinitely many theories. For these latter theories, set theorists often use forcing to
construct outer models of the given model; but nevertheless the Boolean ultrapower
method provides definable interpreted models of these theories inside the original
model (see theorem 7). Similarly, in models of ZFC with large cardinals, one can
define fine-structural canonical inner models with large cardinals and models of ZF
satisfying various determinacy principles, and vice versa. In this way, set theory
exhibits an abundance of natural mutually interpretable theories.
Do these instances of mutual interpretation fulfill the more vigourous conception
of bi-interpretation? Two models or theories are mutually interpretable, when
merely each is interpreted in the other, whereas bi-interpretation requires that the
interpretations are invertible in a sense after iteration, so that if one should interpret
one model or theory in the other and then re-interpret the first theory inside that,
then the resulting model should be definably isomorphic to the original universe
(precise definitions in sections §2 and §3). The interpretations mentioned above are
not bi-interpretations, for if we start in a model of ZFC+¬CH and then go to L in
order to interpret a model of ZFC +GCH, then we’ve already discarded too much
set-theoretic information to expect that we could get a copy of our original model
back by interpreting inside L. This problem is inherent, in light of the following
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theorem of Ali Enayat, showing that indeed there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation
phenomenon to be found amongst the set-theoretic models and theories satisfying
ZF. In interpretation, one must inevitably discard set-theoretic information.
Theorem 1 (Enayat [Ena16]).
(1) ZF is tight: no two distinct theories extending ZF are bi-interpretable.
(2) Indeed, ZF is semantically tight: no two non-isomorphic models of ZF are
bi-interpretable.
(3) What is more, ZF is solid: if M and N are mutually interpretable models
of ZF and the isomorphism of M with its copy inside the interpreted copy
of N in M is M -definable, then M and N are isomorphic.
We introduce the concept of semantic tightness in this paper, since we find it very
natural; Enayat had proved statements (1) and (3); we provide proofs in section §6.
One should view solidity as a strengthening of semantic tightness—it amounts es-
sentially to a one-sided version of semantic tightness, requiring the models to be
isomorphic not only in instances of bi-interpretation, but also even in the case that
only one of the two interpretation isomorphisms is definable, rather than both of
them. Thus, statement (3) is a strengthening of statement (2). And statement (2)
is an easy strengthening of statement (1), as we explain in corollary 14.
The proofs of these theorems seem to use the full strength of ZF, and Enayat
had consequently inquired whether the solidity/tightness phenomenon somehow
required the strength of ZF set theory. In this paper, we shall find support for
that conjecture by establishing nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation in various
natural weak set theories, including Zermelo-Fraenkel theory ZFC−, without the
power set axiom, and Zermelo set theory Z, without the replacement axiom.
Main Theorems.
(1) ZFC− is not solid.
(2) ZFC− is not semantically tight, not even for well-founded models: there are
well-founded models of ZFC− that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic.
(3) Indeed, it is relatively consistent with ZFC that 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 are
bi-interpretable and indeed bi-interpretation synonymous.
(4) ZFC− is not tight: there are distinct bi-interpretable extensions of ZFC−.
(5) Z is not semantically tight (and hence not solid): there are well-founded
models of Z that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic.
(6) Indeed, every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a transitive inner model
of Z in which the replacement axiom fails.
(7) Z is not tight: there are distinct bi-interpretable extensions of Z.
These claims are made and proved in theorems 21, 18, 19, 22, and 23. We shall
in addition prove the following theorems on this theme:
(7) Nonisomorphic well-founded models of ZF set theory are never mutually
interpretable.
(8) The Va¨a¨na¨nen internal categoricity theorem does not hold for ZFC−, not
even for well-founded models.
These are theorems 15 and 17. Statement (8) concerns the existence of a model
〈M,∈,∈〉 satisfying ZFC−(∈,∈), meaning ZFC− in the common language with both
predicates, using either ∈ or ∈ as the membership relation, such that 〈M,∈〉 and
〈M,∈〉 are not isomorphic.
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2. Interpretability in models
Let us briefly review what interpretability means. The reader is likely familiar
with the usual interpretation of the complex field 〈C,+, ·, 0, 1, i〉 in the real field
〈R,+, ·〉, where one represents the complex number a + bi with the pair of real
numbers (a, b). The point is that complex number field operations are definable
operations on these pairs in the real field. Conversely, it turns out that the real
field is not actually interpreted in the complex field (see [Ham20b] for an elementary
account), but it is interpreted in the complex field equipped also with the complex
conjugate operation z 7→ z¯, for in this case you can define the real line as the class of
z for which z = z¯. The reader is also likely familiar with the usual interpretation of
the rational field 〈Q,+, ·〉 in the integer ring 〈Z,+, ·〉, where one represents rational
numbers as equivalence classes of integer pairs (p, q), written more conveniently as
fractions p
q
, with q 6= 0, considered under the equivalence relation p
q
≡ r
s
↔ ps = qr;
one then defines the rational field structure by means of the familiar fractional
arithmetic. Another example would be the structure of hereditarily finite sets
〈HF,∈〉, which is interpreted in the standard model of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉
by the Ackermann relation, the relation for which n E m just in case the nth binary
digit of m is 1; this relation is definable in arithmetic and the reader may verify
that 〈HF,∈〉 ∼= 〈N, E〉.
More generally, we interpret one model in another as follows.
Definition 2. A model N = 〈N,R, . . .〉 in a first-order language LN is interpreted
in another model M in language LM , if for some finite k there is an M -definable
(possibly with parameters) class N∗ ⊆ Mk of k-tuples and M -definable relations
RN
∗
on N∗ for relation symbols R in LN , as well as functions (defined via their
graphs) and constants, and an M -definable equivalence relation ≃ on N∗, which is
a congruence with respect to those relations, for which there is an isomorphism j
from N to the quotient structure 〈N∗, RN
∗
, . . .〉/ ≃.
M
N∗
N
j
Figure 1. Model N is interpreted in model M
In models supporting an internal encoding of finite tuples, such as the models of
arithmetic or set theory, there is no need for k-tuples and one may regard N ⊆M
directly. In models of arithmetic or models of set theory with a definable global well-
order, there is no need for the equivalence relation ≃, since one can pick canonical
least representatives from each class. Theorem 9 shows furthermore that in models
of ZF, even when there isn’t a definable global well-order, one can still omit the need
for the equivalence relation ≃ by means of Scott’s trick: replace every equivalence
class with the set of its ∈-minimal rank elements. Thus, in the model-theoretic
terminology, the theory ZF is said to eliminate imaginaries. This trick doesn’t
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necessarily work, however, in models of ZFC−, without the power set axiom, since
in this theory the class of minimal rank members could still be a proper class,
although in ZF it is always a set.
Definition 3. Models M and N are mutually interpretable, if each of them is
interpreted in the other.
M
N∗
N
M∗j
i
Figure 2. Models M and N are mutually interpreted
Since (the quotient of) N∗ is isomorphic to N , we may find the corresponding
copy ofM inside it, and similarly we may find the copy ofN insideM∗, as illustrated
below, where we have now suppressed the representation of the equivalence relation.
M
N∗
M
N
M∗
N
j
i
a
jia¯
uij
u¯
Figure 3. Iterating the interpretations of models M and N
One may simply compose the isomorphisms i and j to form an isomorphism ji
between M and M , which is now a definable subset of M (although the map ji
may not be definable). Because in the general case these are quotient structures,
one should think of the map ji as a relation rather than literally a function, since
each object a in M is in effect associated with an entire equivalence class a¯ in the
quotient structure of M . Similarly, the composition ij is an isomorphism of the
structure N with N , which is now definable in N .
It will be instructive to notice that we have little reason in general to expect
the map ji to be definable in M , and this issue is the key difference between the
mutual interpretation of models and their bi-interpretation.
Definition 4. Models M and N are bi-interpretable, if they are mutually inter-
pretable in such a way that the isomorphisms ji : M ∼= M and ij : N ∼= N arising
by composing the interpretation maps are definable in the original models M and
N , respectively.
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M
N∗
M
N
M∗
N
j
i
a
ji
a¯
u
ij
u¯
Figure 4. Models M and N are bi-interpreted
A somewhat cleaner picture emerges, as indicated below, if we should simply
identify the model N with its isomorphic copy N∗ and M∗ with M . Let us now
use i to denote the isomorphism of M with its copy M inside N , and j is the
isomorphism of N with its copy N inside M . This picture applies with either
mutual interpretation or bi-interpretation, the difference being that in the case
of bi-interpretation, the isomorphisms i and j are definable in M and N , respec-
tively. Furthermore, by iterating these interpretations, in the case either of mutual
interpretation or bi-interpretation, one achieves a fractal-like nested sequence of de-
finable structures, with isomorphisms at each level. In the case of bi-interpretation,
all these maps are definable inM , and any of the later maps is definable inside any
of the successive copies of M or N in which it resides.
M
N
M
i
N
j
Figure 5. Iterated bi-interpretations
An even stronger connection between models is the notion of bi-interpretation
synonymy. This relation was introduced by Bouvere in [dB65] and recently deep-
ened by Friedman and Visser in [FV14].
Definition 5. Models M and N are bi-interpretation synonymous, if there is a
bi-interpretation for which (i) the domains of the interpreted structures are in each
case the whole structure; and (ii) the equivalence relations used in the interpretation
are the identity relations on M and N .
In remarks after theorem 16, we explain how every instance of bi-interpretation
between models of ZF can be transformed to an instance of bi-interpretation syn-
onymy.
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3. Interpretability in theories
Let us now explain how interpretability works in theories, as opposed to mod-
els. At bottom, an interpretation of one theory in another amounts to a uniform
method of interpreting a model of the first theory in any model of the second theory.
Specifically, we interpret one theory T1 in another theory T2 by providing a way to
translate the T1 language and structure into the language and structure available
in T2, in such a way that the translation of every T1 theorem is provable in T2.
In somewhat more detail, the interpretation I of theory T1 in language L1 into
theory T2 in language L2 should provide, first of all, an L2-formula U(x¯) that will
define the interpreted domain of k-tuples x¯ = (x1, . . . , xk) and an L2-expressible
relation x¯ =I y¯, the interpretation of equality, that T2 proves is an equivalence
relation on tuples in U . Next, for each relation symbol R of L1, the interpretation
should provide a translation RI as an L2 formula of the same arity on U as R has
in L1, and T2 should prove that this relation is well-defined modulo =
I . Finally,
functions are to be handled by considering their graphs f(x¯) = y as definable
relations and interpreting these graph relations, but with the proviso that T2 proves
that the interpreted relation is indeed well-defined and functional on U modulo =I .
Ultimately, therefore, the theory T2 will prove that =
I is a congruence with respect
to the interpreted relations RI and functions f I .
Having thus interpreted the atomic L1 structure, one may naturally extend the
interpretation to all L1 assertions as follows.
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)I = ϕI ∧ ψI
• (¬ϕ)I = ¬ϕI
• (∃xϕ(x))I = ∃x¯ U(x¯) ∧ ϕI(x¯)
Finally, for this to be an interpretation of T1 in T2, we insist that T2 prove that T1
holds for the interpreted structure, or in other words, that
T1 ⊢ ϕ implies T2 ⊢ ϕ
I .
Because the interpretation preserves the boolean and quantifier structure of in-
terpreted formulas, it suffices that T2 should prove the interpretation ϕ
I of each
axiom ϕ of T1. It is clear that if T1 is interpreted in T2 by interpretation I,
then in any model M |= T2 we may use the interpretation to define a model
N =
〈
U,RI , f I , . . .
〉
/ =I of T1. The domain of N will consist of the quotient
of U by =I as M sees it, and the relations R and functions f of N , if any, will be
exactly those defined by RI and f I via the interpretation.
Definition 6.
(1) Two theories T1 and T2 are mutually interpretable, if each of them is inter-
pretable in the other.
(2) Two theories T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable, in contrast, if they are mutually
interpretable by interpretations I and J respectively, which are provably
invertible, in that the theory T1 proves that the universe is isomorphic, by
a definable isomorphism map, to the model resulting by first interpreting
via J to get a model of T2 and then interpreting via I to get a model of
T1 inside that model; and similarly the theory T2 proves that its universe
is definably isomorphic to the model obtained by first interpreting via I to
get a model of T1 and then inside that model via J to get a model of T2.
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With mutual interpretation of theories, one can start with a model M of T1 and
then use J to define within it a model N = JM of T2, which can then define a
model M ′ = IN of T1 again. With mutual interpretability, there is no guarantee
that M ′ and M are isomorphic or even elementarily equivalent, beyond the basic
requirement that both are models of T1. The much stronger requirements of bi-
interpretability, in contrast, ensure thatM ′ andM are isomorphic, and furthermore
isomorphic by a definable isomorphism relation, which the theory T1 proves is an
isomorphism. And similarly when interpreting in models of T2. Thus, with bi-
interpretation, each theory sees how its own structure is faithfully copied via the
definable isomorphisms f1 and f2 under iterations of the interpretations. With
bi-interpretability, it therefore follows that
(1) For every L1 assertion α
T1  ∀x¯ α(x1, . . . , xn)↔ α
J I(f1(x1), f1(x2), . . . , f1(xn)).
(2) For every L2 assertion β
T2  ∀y¯ β(y1, . . . , ym)↔ β
IJ (f2(y1), f2(y2), . . . , f2(ym)).
In light of the quotients by the equivalence relations, the functions f1 and f2 are
more properly thought of as relations f1(x) = y¯ well-defined with respect to those
relations; they need not be functional on points, but only in the quotient.
4. Mutual interpretation of diverse set theories
Let us briefly establish the mutual interpretability phenomenon in set theory.
Theorem 7. The following theories are pairwise mutually interpretable.
(1) ZF
(2) ZFC
(3) ZFC+GCH
(4) ZFC+ V = L
(5) ZF + ¬AC
(6) ZFC+ ¬CH
(7) ZFC+MA+ ¬CH
(8) ZFC+ b < d
(9) Any extension of ZF provably holding in a definable inner model or provably
forceable by set forcing over such an inner model.
Proof. In many of these instances, the interpretation is obtained by defining a
suitable inner model of the desired theory. For example, in any model of ZF, we can
define the constructible universe, and thereby find an interpretation of ZFC+V = L
and hence ZFC + GCH and so forth in ZF. Some of the interpretations involve
forcing, however, which we usually conceive as a method for constructing outer
models, rather than defining models inside the original model. Nevertheless, one
can use forcing via the Boolean ultrapower method to define interpreted models of
the forced theory inside the original model. Let us illustrate the general method
by explaining how to interpret the theory ZFC+¬CH in ZF. In ZF, we may define
L, and thereby define a model of ZFC with a definable global well-order. Inside
that model, consider the forcing notion Add(ω, ω2) to add ω2 many Cohen reals.
Let B be the Boolean completion of this forcing notion in L, and let U ⊆ B be the
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L-least ultrafilter on this Boolean algebra. Using the Boolean ultrapower method,
we define the quotient structure LB/U on the class of B-names by the relations:
σ =U τ ⇐⇒ [[σ = τ ]] ∈ U ;
σ ∈U τ ⇐⇒ [[σ ∈ τ ]] ∈ U.
The model LB/U consists of the =U equivalence classes of B-names in L under the
membership relation ∈U . The Boolean ultrapower  Los´ theorem shows that L
B/U
satisfies every statement ϕ whose Boolean value [[ϕ ]] is in U , and so this is a model
of ZFC + ¬CH. We should like to emphasize that there is no need in the Boolean
ultrapower construction for the ultrafilter U to be generic in any sense, and U ∈ L is
completely fine (see extensive explanation in [HS06, §2]). By using the L-least such
ultrafilter U on B, therefore, we eliminate the need for parameters—the Boolean
ultrapower quotient LB/U is a definable interpreted model of ZFC + ¬CH inside
the original model, as desired.
The same method works generally. Any forceable theory will hold in an inter-
preted model, using the forcing notion and the ultrafilter U in the original model
as parameters; when forcing over L or HOD one may use the corresponding defin-
able well-order to eliminate the need for parameters, as we did above. Any theory
that is provably forceable over a definable inner model will be forceable over L and
therefore amenable to this parameter-elimination method. 
Apter, Gitman and Hamkins [AGH12] similarly establish in numerous instances
that one can find transitive inner models 〈M,∈〉 of certain large cardinal theories
usually obtained by forcing. For example, if there is a supercompact cardinal, then
there is a definable transitive inner model with a Laver-indestructible supercompact
cardinal, and another inner model with a non-indestructible supercompact cardinal,
and another with a strongly compact cardinal that was also the least measurable
cardinal, and so on.
As we emphasized in the introduction of this article, theorem 7 is concerned with
mutual interpretation rather than bi-interpretation. The interpretation methods
used in this theorem are not invertible, and when following an interpretation, one
cannot in general get back to the original model. Every interpretation of one set
theory in another will inevitably involve a loss of set-theoretic information in the
models in which it is undertaken. The main lesson of Enayat’s theorem (theorem
13) is that this problem is unavoidable: in fact, none of the theories above are bi-
interpretable and there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon to be found
in set theory at the strength of ZF.
One might have hoped to invert the forcing extension interpretations by means
of the ground-model definability theorem ([Lav07], see also [FHR15]), which asserts
that every ground modelM is definable (using parameters) in its forcing extensions
M [G] by set forcing. That is, since we have interpreted the theory of the forcing
extension, can’t we reinterpret the ground model by means of the ground-model
definability theorem? The problem with this idea is that the forcing Boolean ultra-
power modelMB/U that we used in theorem 7 is not actually a forcing extension of
M , but rather a forcing extension of its own ground model Mˇ/U , which in general
is not the same as M , although it is an elementary extension of M by the Boolean
ultrapower map i : M → Mˇ/U . This map is an isomorphism only when U is
M -generic, which is not true here for nontrivial forcing because U ∈ M . Indeed,
the Boolean ultrapower model Mˇ/U is usually ill-founded, even when M is well
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founded (although there can be instances of well-founded Boolean ultrapowers con-
nected with very large large cardinals; see [HS06]). Nevertheless, the method does
allow us to mutually interpret the theory ofM with the theory of what it would be
like in a forcing extension of M after forcing with B, as explained by the following
theorem:
Theorem 8. For any model M |= ZFC and any notion of forcing B ∈ M , the
theory of M with constants for every element of M is mutually interpretable with
the theory, in the forcing language with constants for every B-name in M , asserting
that the universe is a forcing extension via B of a ground model with the theory of
M .
Proof. The latter theory, describing what it would be like in a forcing extension
of M by B, is the same theory as used in the naturalist account of forcing in
[Ham12]. The theory has a predicate symbol Mˇ for an inner model and asserts
that this satisfies the same theory asM and that the universe is a forcing extension
Mˇ [G] for some Mˇ -generic filter G ⊆ Bˇ. To be clear, we are not saying that the
modelM is mutually interpretable with some actual forcing extension modelM [G],
but rather only that the theory of M is mutually interpretable with the theory
expressing what it is like in such a forcing extension. We allow parameters in the
interpretation definitions, although in many cases these are eliminable. Assume
that B is a complete Boolean algebra in M , and let U ⊆ B be an ultrafilter in
M . Inside M , we may define the forcing Boolean ultrapower MB/U as described
above, and this is a model of the theory asserting (in the forcing language) that
the universe is a forcing extension of Mˇ by Bˇ. That this is true is part of the
theory ofM , and so this interpretation works inside any model of the theory of M .
Conversely, inside any model of the latter theory, we can define the ground model
Mˇ , which will be a model of the theory of M . 
5. Further background on interpreting in models of set theory
Before getting to the main results, let us prove some further useful background
material on interpretations in models of set theory. We have already mentioned in
the remarks after definition 2 that in models of set theory, we do not need to use
k-tuples in interpretation, since we have definable pairing functions. But also, it
turns out that when interpreting in a model of ZF, we do not need the equivalence
relation:
Theorem 9. If a structure A is interpreted in a model of ZF set theory, then there
is an interpretation in which the equivalence relation is the identity.
This theorem appears as exercise 2 of section 4.4 of [Hod93].
Proof. The argument amounts to what is known as “Scott’s trick.” If ≃ is a defin-
able equivalence relation in a model M |= ZF, then let us replace every equivalence
class [a]≃ with the Scott class [a]
∗
≃, which consists of the elements of the equivalence
class having minimal possible ∈-rank in that class. This is a definable set in M ,
and from the Scott class one can identity the original ≃ equivalence class. So we
can replace the original interpretation modulo ≃ with the induced interpretation
defined on the Scott classes. And since two Scott classes correspond to the same
interpreted object if and only if they are equal, we have thereby eliminated the
need for the equivalence relation. 
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This proof does not work in ZFC−, that is, in set theory without the power set
axiom, because the minimal rank instances from a class may still form a proper
class, and so Scott’s trick doesn’t succeed in reducing the class to a set. And so we
had asked the question, posting it on MathOverflow [Ham20a]:
Question 10. Is there a structure that is interpretable in a model of ZFC−, but
only by means of a nontrivial equivalence relation?
The question was answered affirmative by Gabe Goldberg [Gol20], assuming the
consistency of large cardinals. He pointed out that if ADL(R) holds and δ12 = ω2,
there is a projectively definable prewellordering on the reals of order type ω2, and
so the order structure 〈ω2, <〉 is interpretable in 〈Hω1 ,∈〉, but there is no definable
order in this structure of type ω2, because there is, he proves, no injection of ω2 into
Hω1 in L(R). Therefore, under these assumptions, we have a structure interpretable
in a model of ZFC−, using a nontrivial equivalence relation, but not without. Can
one produce an example in ZFC?
Next, we establish the phenomenon of automatic bi-interpretability for well-
founded models of set theory.
Theorem 11. If a well-founded modelM of ZF− is interpreted in itself via i :M →
M/ ≃, then the interpretation isomorphism map i is unique and furthermore, it is
definable in M .
Proof. Assume that M is a well-founded model of ZF−, which we may assume
without loss to be transitive, and that 〈M,∈〉 is interpreted in itself via the inter-
pretation map i : 〈M,∈〉 ∼=
〈
M,∈
〉
/ ≃, where M ⊆ M is a definable class in M
with a definable relation ∈, and ≃ is a definable equivalence relation on M , which
is a congruence with respect to ∈.
M
M
i
Since models of set theory admit pair functions, however, we may assume directly
that M ⊆M rather than M ⊆Mk with k-tuples.
Let pi = i−1 : M → M be the inverse map, viewed as a map on M . Since
i is an isomorphism, it follows that b ∈ a ⇐⇒ i(b) ∈ i(a), and consequently,
pi(a¯) = { pi(b¯) | b¯ ∈ a¯ }. Thus, pi is precisely the Mostowski collapse of the relation ∈
on M , which is well-founded precisely because it has a quotient that is isomorphic
to 〈M,∈〉. Thus, the map i is unique, for it is precisely the inverse of the Mostowski
collapse of
〈
M,∈
〉
/ ≃, as computed externally to M in the context where i exists.
What remains is to show that M itself can undertake this Mostowski collapse.
While the ≃-quotient of ∈ is a well-founded extensional relation, the subtle issue is
that ∈ may not literally be set-like, since the ≃-equivalence classes themselves may
be proper classes, and in ZF− we are not necessarily able to pick representatives
globally from the equivalence classes. So it may not be immediately clear that M
can undertake the Mostowski collapse. But, we show, it can.
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In M , let I be the class of pairs (a, a¯) where a ∈ M and a¯ ∈ M and there is
a set A ∈ M with (i) A ⊆ M ; (ii) A is transitive with respect to ∈ modulo ≃, in
the sense that if x ∈ y ∈ A, then there is some x′ ∈ A such that x ≃ x′; and (iii)〈
A,∈
〉
/ ≃ is isomorphic to 〈TC({a}),∈〉. Note that if (a, a¯) are like this, then the
isomorphism will be exactly the inverse of the Mostowski collapse of
〈
A,∈
〉
/ ≃.
We claim by ∈M -induction (externally to M) that every a¯ ∈M is associated in
this way with some a ∈ M , and furthermore, the association I is simply the map
i : a 7→ a¯. To see this, suppose a¯ ∈ M and every ∈M -element of a¯ is associated
via I. Since i is an isomorphism, there is some a such that i(a) = a¯. Inductively,
every b¯ ∈M a¯ is associated with some b for which i(b) = b¯, and all such b are
necessarily elements of a. So M can see that every b¯ ∈M a¯ is associated by the
class I with a unique element b ∈ a. For each b, there are various sets Bb with
largest element b¯ realizing that (b, b¯) ∈ I. By the collection axiom, we can find a
single set B containing such a set for every b ∈ a, serving as a single witnessing
set. Let A = {a¯} ∪ B, where a¯ is a representative of the ≃-class of i(a). This
is a set in M , it is contained in M and it is transitive with respect to ∈ modulo
≃. Since Bb ⊆ A, the Mostowski collapse of
〈
A,∈
〉
/ ≃ agrees with the collapse
of
〈
Bb,∈
〉
/ ≃, and so sends b¯ to b, for every b ∈ a. So this set A witnesses that
(a, a¯) ∈ I, and agrees with i on a. So the map i is definable in M , as desired. 
Notice that theorem 11 is not true if one drops the well-foundedness assumption.
For example, on general model-theoretic grounds there must be models M |= ZF−
with nontrivial automorphisms i :M →M , and any such map is an interpretation
of M in itself (as itself), but such an automorphism can never be definable. Sim-
ilarly, if ZFC is consistent, then there is a countable computably saturated model〈
M,∈M
〉
|= ZFC, and such a model contains an isomorphic copy of itself as an
element m, an observation due to [Sch78, corollary 3.3]; see also [GH10, lemma 7].
This provides an interpretation of M in itself, using m as a parameter, but the
isomorphism cannot be definable nor even amenable to M , since M cannot allow a
definable injection from the universe to a set.
Corollary 12. Every instance of mutual interpretation amongst well-founded mod-
els of ZF− is a bi-interpretation. Indeed, if M is a well-founded model of ZF− and
mutually interpreted with any structure N of any theory, as in the figure below,
then the isomorphism i :M →M is definable in M .
M
N
M
a
i
a¯
Proof. This follows immediately from theorem 11, since any instance of mutual
interpretation leads to an instance of a model being interpreted inside itself, and
so by theorem 11 the interpretation maps will be definable. 
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We are unsure whether we can achieve the half-way situation, where a transitive
model M |= ZF− is mutually interpreted with some nonstandard model N |= ZF−,
without being bi-interpreted.
6. Bi-interpretation does not occur in models of ZF
Finally, we come to the heart of the paper, concerning the extent of bi-interpretation
in set theory. Let us begin with Enayat’s theorem, which will show that distinct
models of ZF are never bi-interpretable. As we mentioned earlier, a theory T is
semantically tight, if any two bi-interpretable models of T are isomorphic. Strength-
ening this, a theory T is solid, if wheneverM andN are mutually interpreted models
of T and there is an M -definable isomorphism of M with its copy M inside the
copy of N defined in M , then M and N are isomorphic. Thus, solidity strength-
ens semantic tightness, because it requires the models to be isomorphic even when
one has essentially only half of a bi-interpretation, in that only one side of the
interpretation needs to be definable in the model, rather than both.
Theorem 13 (Enayat [Ena16]). ZF is solid.
Proof. Assume that M and N are mutually interpreted models of ZF, where N is
definable in M and M is a definable copy of M inside N , with an isomorphism
i :M →M that is definable in M , as illustrated here:
M
N
M
i
Suppose that N thinks A is a nonempty subclass of M . Consider the pre-image
A′ = { i−1(x) | x ∈N A }, which is a nonempty class in M . So it must have an
∈M -minimal element a ∈M A′. It follows that i(a) is an ∈M -minimal element of A,
and so N sees ∈M as well founded. Because of this fact, the ordinals of the models
will be comparable, and they will have some ordinals isomorphically in common.
We claim that for these common ordinals, the rank-initial segments of M , N and
M are isomorphic. Specifically, if α is an ordinal in M , which is isomorphic to
the ordinal α = i(α) in M , and this happens to be isomorphic in N to an ordinal
α∗ in N , then we claim that N can see that 〈Vα∗ ,∈〉
N
is isomorphic to 〈Vα,∈〉
M
,
which we know is isomorphic to 〈Vα,∈〉
M . This is certainly true when α = 0, and
if it is true at α, then it will also be true at α + 1, because every subset of V Nα
exists also as a class in M and therefore can be pushed via i to the corresponding
subset of VMα ; and conversely, every subset of V
M
α in M exists also as a class in
N and can be pulled back by the isomorphism with V Nα∗ . So in N we may extend
the isomorphism canonically from V Nα∗
∼= VMα to V
N
α∗+1
∼= VMα+1. Furthermore,
because V Nα∗ is transitive in N and transitive sets are rigid, the isomorphisms must
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be unique, and so at limit stages the isomorphism will simply be the coherent union
of the isomorphisms at the earlier stages.
If the ordinals of N run out before the ordinals of M , then OrdN is isomorphic
to an ordinal λ in M and hence to i(λ) = λ in M . In this case, the isomorphism
from the previous paragraph will mean that N = V NOrd
∼= VM
λ
, which is isomorphic
to VMλ . So M will see that N is bijective with a set. But M has a bijection of itself
with M , which is contained in N . So M will think that the universe is bijective
with a set, which is impossible in ZF.
If in contrast the ordinals of M and hence M run out before the ordinals of N ,
then N would recognize that M is isomorphic to a transitive set V Nα∗ . Since it is a
set, N has a truth predicate for it, and so N can define a truth predicate for M .
Since N and i are definable in M , we can pull this truth predicate back via i to
produce anM -definable truth predicate onM , contrary to Tarski’s theorem on the
nondefinability of truth.
So the ordinals of the three models must be exactly isomorphic, and so the
isomorphisms of the rank-initial segments of the models in fact produce an isomor-
phism of N = V NOrd with M = V
M
Ord and hence with M , as desired. 
Albert Visser had initially proved a corresponding result in 2004 for Peano
arithmetic PA in [Vis04, see pp.52–55],[Vis06]. Ali Enayat had followed with a
nice model-theoretic argument showing specifically that ZF and ZFC are not bi-
interpretable, using the fact that ZFC models can have no involutions in their
automorphism groups, but ZF models can, before finally proving the general ver-
sion of his theorem, for ZF, for second-order arithmetic Z2 and for second-order set
theory KM in [Ena16]. The ZF version was apparently also observed independently
by Harvey Friedman and Albert Visser, by Fedor Pakhomov, as well as by ourselves
[Ham18], before we had realized that this was a rediscovery.
Enayat defines that a theory T is tight, if whenever two extensions of T are
bi-interpretable, then they are the same theory.
Corollary 14. ZF is tight. That is, no two distinct set theories extending ZF are
bi-interpretable.
This corollary follows from theorem 13, because in fact every solid theory is tight.
If T is solid, and T1, T2 are distinct bi-interpretable extensions of T , then consider
any modelM |= T1. By the bi-interpretability of the theories,M is bi-interpretable
with a model N |= T2. Since these are both models of T , it follows by the solidity
of T thatM and N are isomorphic, and soM is a model of T2. Since the argument
also works conversely, the two theories are the same.
In particular, ZF is not bi-interpretable with ZFC, nor with ZFC+CH, nor
ZFC + ¬CH and so on. Theorem 7 therefore cannot be strengthened from mu-
tual interpretation to bi-interpretation, and there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation
phenomenon in set theory amongst the models or theories strengthening ZF.
Furthermore, we claim that there is no mutual interpretation phenomenon amongst
the well-founded models of ZF.
Theorem 15. Nonisomorphic well-founded models of ZF are never mutually in-
terpretable.
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Proof. Corollary 12 shows that every instance of mutual interpretation amongst
the well-founded models of ZF is a bi-interpretation, but theorem 13 shows that bi-
interpretation amongst models of ZF occurs only between isomorphic models. 
Let us now explain how to deduce the solidity of ZF by means of the following
“internal categoricity” theorem of Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen. He had stated the result in
[Va¨19] for ZFC, but his argument did not use AC, and so we state and prove it
here for ZF.
Theorem 16 (Va¨a¨na¨nen [Va¨19]). Assume that 〈V,∈,∈〉 is a model of ZF with
respect to both membership relations ∈ and ∈, in the common language. More
precisely, it is a model of ZF∈(∈), using ∈ as the membership relation and ∈ as a
class predicate and also of ZF∈(∈), using ∈ as the membership relation and ∈ as a
class predicate. Then 〈V,∈〉 ∼= 〈V,∈〉, and furthermore, there is a unique definable
isomorphism in 〈V,∈,∈〉.
Proof. Let us begin by observing that by the foundation axiom, every nonempty
definable ∈-class will admit an ∈-minimal element, and similarly every nonempty
definable ∈-class will have an ∈-minimal element. Thus, both ∈ and ∈ will be
well-founded relations in this model, regardless of whether we use ∈ or ∈ as the
membership relation. In particular, the orders 〈Ord〈V,∈〉,∈〉 and 〈Ord〈V,∈〉,∈〉 will
be comparable well-ordered classes, and we may assume without loss that the former
is isomorphic to an initial segment of the latter. Thus, for every ∈-ordinal α, there
is an ∈-ordinal α to which it is isomorphic, and furthermore this ordinal is unique,
and the isomorphism is unique. We claim that 〈Vα,∈〉 ∼=
〈
V α,∈
〉
, by induction
on α. Since these are transitive sets and hence rigid, the isomorphism is unique.
The claim is clearly true for α = 0. It remains true through limit ordinals, since
the isomorphism in that case is simply the union of the previous isomorphisms. At
successor stages, we need only observe that any isomorphism of 〈Vα,∈〉 with
〈
V α,∈
〉
extends to an isomorphism of the power set, since any ∈-subset of Vα transfers to
an ∈-subset of V α by pointwise application of the isomorphism, and vice versa.
If Ord〈V,∈〉 is taller than Ord〈V,∈〉, then we can see that 〈V,∈〉 ∼=
〈
V γ ,∈
〉
, where
γ ∈ Ord〈V ,∈〉 is the first ∈-ordinal not arising from an ∈-ordinal. But now V γ+1,
which is the ∈-power set of V γ , is a subclass of V and therefore injects into V γ ,
contrary to Cantor’s theorem. So the ordinals are the same height, and thus we
have achieved 〈V,∈〉 ∼= 〈V,∈〉. This isomorphism is definable, since every Vα is
isomorphic to V α by a unique isomorphism. 
Theorem 13, statements (1) and (2), can be seen as a consequence of this
theorem—and indeed the proofs we gave are roughly analogous—because if two
models of ZF are bi-interpretable, then by the results mentioned in section 5, we
do not need tuples or nonidentity equivalence relations. So the interpretations
will interpret each model as a subclass of the other. By the class version of the
Schro¨der-Cantor-Bernstein theorem, these injections can be transformed into bi-
jection of the models, and in this way the bi-interpretation can be transformed
into a bi-interpretation synonymy (see also [FV14]). Thus, we reduce to the case
of two membership relations 〈M,∈,∈〉 on the whole universe, with each relation
being definable when using the other as the membership relation. Because of this,
the model will satisfy the theory ZF(∈,∈), and consequently the models will be
isomorphic 〈M,∈〉 ∼= 〈M,∈〉 by Va¨a¨na¨nen’s theorem.
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7. Va¨a¨na¨nen internal categoricity fails for ZFC−
Theorems 13 and 16 were both proved with arguments that made a fundamental
use of the Vα hierarchy, thereby relying on the power set axiom. Was the use of the
Vα hierarchy significant? Can one prove the analogues of the theorems for ZFC
−,
that is, for set theory without the power set axiom? (See [GHJ16] for a subtlety
about exactly what the theory ZFC− is; one should include the collection axiom,
and not just replacement.) The answer is negative. We shall prove that neither
theorem is true for ZFC−, not even in the case of well-founded models. Let us
begin by proving that the Va¨a¨na¨nen internal categoricity theorem fails for ZFC−.
Theorem 17. There is a transitive set M and an alternative well-founded mem-
bership relation ∈ on M , such that 〈M,∈,∈〉 satisfies ZFC−(∈,∈), that is, ZFC−
using either ∈ or ∈ as the membership relation and allowing both as class predicates,
such that 〈M,∈〉 is not isomorphic to 〈M,∈〉, although both are well-founded.
Proof. Let us argue first merely that the situation is consistent with ZFC. Assume
that Luzin’s hypothesis holds, that is, 2ω = 2ω1 ; for example, this holds after
adding ω2 many Cohen reals over a model of GCH, since in this case we would have
2ω = 2ω1 = ω2. It follows that Hω1 and Hω2 are equinumerous, and so there is a
bijection pi : Hω1 → Hω2 . Let ∈˜ be the image of ∈↾ Hω1 under this bijection, and
let ∈ be the preimage of ∈↾ Hω2 . Thus, pi is an isomorphism of the structures
pi : 〈Hω1 ,∈,∈〉
∼= 〈Hω2 , ∈˜,∈〉 .
The first of these is a model of ZFC−(∈), using ∈ as membership, since Hω1 is a
model of ZFC− with respect to any predicate. Similarly, the second is a model of
ZFC−(∈˜), again using ∈ as membership, since we can likewise augment Hω2 with
any predicate. By following the isomorphism, an equivalent way to say this is that
〈Hω1 ,∈,∈〉 is a model of ZFC
−
∈ (∈), using ∈ as membership and ∈ as predicate,
and also a model of ZFC−
∈
(∈), using ∈ as membership this time and ∈ as a class
predicate. But 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 is not isomorphic to 〈Hω1 ,∈〉, because the first thinks every
set is countable and the second does not. So this model is just as desired.
To get outright existence of the models, observe first that by taking an elementary
substructure, we can find a countable model of the desired form in the forcing
extension. Furthermore, the existence of a countable well-founded model 〈M,∈,∈〉
with the desired properties is a Σ12 assertion, which is therefore absolute to the
forcing extension by Shoenfield’s absoluteness theorem. And so therefore there
must have already been such an example in the ground model, without need for
any forcing. 
8. ZFC− is neither solid nor tight
In order to show that ZFC− is not solid, we need to provide different models
of ZFC− that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic. Let us begin by describing
merely how this can happen in some models of set theory. For this, we shall employ
a more refined version of the argument used to prove theorem 17.
Theorem 18. In the Solovay-Tennenbaum model ofMA+¬CH obtained by c.c.c. forc-
ing over the constructible universe, the structures 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 are bi-
interpretable. Thus, there can be two well-founded models of ZFC− that are bi-
interpretable, but not isomorphic.
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The features we require in the Solovay-Tennenbaum model are the following:
• Hω1 has a definable almost disjoint ω1-sequence of reals;
• every subset A ⊆ ω1 is coded by a real via almost-disjoint coding with
respect to this sequence.
In other words, there should be a definable ω1-sequence 〈aα | α < ω1〉 of infinite
subsets aα ⊆ ω with any two having finite intersection; and for every A ⊆ ω1 there
should be a ⊆ ω for which α ∈ A ↔ a ∩ aα is infinite. These properties are true
in the Solovay-Tennenbaum model L[G], because we can define the almost disjoint
family in L, and by Martin’s axiom every subset of ω1 is coded with respect to it
by almost-disjoint coding.
Proof. Let us assume we have the two properties isolated above. The structure
〈Hω1 ,∈〉, of course, is a definable substructure of 〈Hω2 ,∈〉, which gives one direc-
tion of the interpretation. It remains to interpret 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 inside 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and to
prove that this is a bi-interpretation. The second assumption above implies, of
course, that 2ω = 2ω1 , and so at least the two structures have the same cardinality.
But more, because the almost-disjoint sequence is definable in Hω1 and all the reals
are there, the structure 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 in effect has access to the full power set P (ω1); the
subsets A ⊆ ω1 are uniformly definable in the structure 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 from real param-
eters. And furthermore, every set in Hω2 is coded by a subset of ω1. Specifically, if
x ∈ Hω2 then x is an element of a transitive set t of size ω1, with 〈t,∈〉
∼= 〈ω1, E〉 for
some well-founded extensional relation E on ω1. The set x can be in effect coded by
specifying E and the ordinal α representing x in the structure 〈ω1, E〉. Since Hω1
contains all countable sequences of ordinals, it can correctly identify which rela-
tions E on ω1, as encoded by a real via the almost-disjoint coding, are well-founded
and extensional. Let us define an equivalence relation a ≃ a′ for reals a, a′ ⊆ ω
coding such pairs (α,E) and (α′, E′) that represent the same set, which happens
just in case there is an isomorphism of the hereditary E-predecessors of α to the
hereditary E′-predecessors of α′; in other words, when the transitive closures of the
corresponding encoded sets {x} and {x′} are isomorphic. The isomorphism itself
is a map of size at most ω1, which can therefore be seen definably in the structure
〈Hω1 ,∈〉. And we can recognize when the set x coded by (α,E) is an element of
the set y coded by (β, F ), since this just means that (α,E) is equivalent to (γ, F )
for some γ F β. Since every element of Hω2 is coded in this way by relations on ω1
and hence ultimately by reals a ⊆ ω, we see that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 is interpreted in 〈Hω1 ,∈〉
by the codes (α,E) for well-founded extensional relations E on ω1, which are them-
selves coded by reals via almost-disjoint coding. Ultimately, objects x ∈ Hω2 are
represented by a real a ⊆ coding a pair (α,E) which codes a transitive set having
x as an element at index α in that coding.
This interpretation is a bi-interpretation, because Hω1 can construct suitable
codes for any object x ∈ Hω1 , and thereby recognize how itself arises within the
interpreted copy of Hω2 . And conversely, Hω2 can define Hω1 as a submodel and it
can see how the objects in Hω2 are represented inside that model via almost disjoint
coding. The models 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 are therefore well-founded models of
ZFC− that are bi-interpretable, but they are not isomorphic, because the first
model thinks every set is countable and the second does not. 
We can improve the previous theorem to achieve an actual synonymy of the two
structures as follows.
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Theorem 19. If ZFC is consistent, then it is consistent that there is a member-
ship relation ∈ definable in 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 such that 〈Hω1 ,∈〉
∼= 〈Hω2 ,∈〉, putting these
structures into bi-interpretation synonymy.
Proof. The argument relies on a result of Leo Harrington [Har77], showing that it
is relatively consistent with ZFC that MA + ¬CH hold, yet there is a projectively
definable well-ordering of the reals; in fact, Harrington achieves this in a forcing ex-
tension of L. (Many thanks to Gabe Goldberg [Gol20] for pointing out Harrington’s
paper in response to our MathOverflow question concerning the possibility of this
theorem.) In such a model, we can choose least elements within each equivalence
class of reals in the interpretation used in the proof of theorem 18, and thereby
omit the need for an equivalence relation in the first place. So every element of Hω2
will be coded by a real. Since the decoding of hereditarily countable sets can be
undertaken inside Hω1 , we thereby have a definable injection of Hω1 into the coding
reals, and so by the Cantor-Schro¨der–Bernstein theorem, Hω1 is bijective with the
coding reals. Because the Cantor-Schro¨der–Bernstein theorem is sufficiently con-
structive, this bijection is definable inside 〈Hω1 ,∈〉, and so we may pull back the
interpreted membership relation on the coding reals to get a definable relation ∈
on all of Hω1 , such that 〈Hω1 ,∈〉
∼= 〈Hω2 ,∈〉, as desired. This is a bi-interpretation
synonymy, since Hω1 can see how it is represented in that coding, and Hω2 can
define Hω1 and also see how its elements are coded. 
We find it interesting to compare theorems 18 and 19 with [Ena16, corollary 2.5.1],
which says that ZFC−+“every set is countable” is solid, and similarly corollary
2.7.1, which asserts that ZFC− + “V = Hκ+ for some inaccessible cardinal κ” also
is solid.
The following theorem explains somewhat the need in theorem 18 for assuming
that we were working close to L.
Theorem 20. If there is no projectively definable ω1-sequence of distinct reals, then
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 cannot be interpreted in 〈Hω1 ,∈〉. In particular, in this case the structures
are not bi-interpretable nor even mutually interpretable.
The hypothesis is a direct consequence of sufficient large cardinals, since it is a
consequence of ADL(R). But meanwhile, it can also be forced by the Le´vy collapse
of an inaccessible cardinal; and since it implies ω1 is inaccessible to reals, it is
equiconsistent with an inaccessible cardinal.
Proof. If Hω2 were interpreted in Hω1 , then since the former structure definitely
has an ω1-sequence of distinct reals, such a sequence would be definable (from
parameters) in the structure 〈Hω1 ,∈〉. But this latter structure is interpreted in the
reals in second-order arithmetic, by coding hereditarily countable sets by relations
on ω. By means of this interpretation, first-order assertions in 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 can be
viewed as projective assertions. And so there would be a projectively definable
ω1-sequence of distinct reals, contrary to our assumption. 
Meanwhile, we can extend theorem 18 from the consistency result to prove out-
right in ZFC that there are always transitive counterexample models to be found.
Theorem 21. The theory ZFC− is not solid, and not even semantically tight, not
even for well-founded models. Indeed, there are transitive models 〈M,∈〉, 〈N,∈〉 of
ZFC− that form a bi-interpretation synonymy, but are not isomorphic.
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Proof. By theorem 19, there are such transitive sets in a forcing extension of L. In
that model, by taking a countable elementary substructure, we can find countable
transitive sets with the desired feature. And furthermore, the assertion that there
are such countable transitive sets like that, for which the particular bi-interpretation
definitions work and form a synonymy, is a statement of complexity Σ12. By Shoen-
field absoluteness, this statement must already be true in L, and hence also in V .
So there are countable transitive models 〈M,∈〉 and 〈N,∈〉 of ZFC− that form a
bi-interpretation synonymy, but are not isomorphic. 
And we can also use the argument to show that ZFC− is not tight.
Theorem 22. ZFC− is not tight.
Proof. We shall find two extensions of ZFC− that are bi-interpretable, but not
the same theory. Let us take T1 and T2 be the theories describing the situation
of 〈Hω1 ,∈〉 and 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 in theorem 18. Specifically, let T2 assert ZFC
− plus the
assertion that ω1 exists but not ω2, that ω1 = ω
L
1 , that ω2 = ω
L
2 , and that every
subset of ω1 is coded by a real using the almost-disjoint coding with respect to
the L-least almost-disjoint family 〈aα | α < ω1〉. Let T1 be the theory ZFC
− plus
the assertion that every set is countable and that the interpretation of Hω2 in
Hω1 used in the proof of theorem 18 defines a model of T2. That is, T1 asserts
that the interpretation does indeed interpret a model of T2. These two theories
are bi-interpretable, using the interpretations provided in the proof of theorem 18,
because any model of T1 interprets a model of T2, and any model of T2 can define
its Hω1 , which will be a model of T1, and the composition maps are definable just
as before. 
9. Zermelo set theory is neither solid nor tight
We should like now to consider the case of Zermelo set theory. We shall prove
that nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation occur in models of Zermelo set theory,
and consequently Zermelo set theory is neither solid nor tight. Specifically, we shall
prove the following:
Theorem 23.
(1) Z is not semantically tight (and hence not solid), not even for well-founded
models: there are bi-interpretable well-founded models of Zermelo set theory
that are not isomorphic.
(2) Every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a transitive inner model of Zer-
melo set theory, in which the replacement axiom fails.
(3) Z is not tight: there are distinct bi-interpretable strengthenings of Z.
Our argument will make fundamental use of the model-construction method
of Adrian Mathias [Mat01]. Mathias had used his methods to construct diverse
interesting models of Zermelo set theory, some of them quite peculiar, such as a
transitive inner model of Zermelo set theory containing all the ordinals, but not
having Vω as an element. Let us briefly review his method. The central definition
is that a class C is fruitful, if
(1) every x ∈ C is transitive;
(2) Ord ⊆ C;
(3) x ∈ C and y ∈ C implies x ∪ y ∈ C;
(4) x ∈ C and y ⊆ P (x) implies x ∪ y ∈ C.
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Fruitful classes, Mathias proves, lead to transitive models of Zermelo set theory as
follows.
Theorem 24 (Mathias [Mat01, prop. 1.2]). If C is fruitful, then M =
⋃
C is a
supertransitive model of Zermelo set theory with the foundation axiom.
A transitive set M is supertransitive, if it contains every subset of its elements,
that is, if x ⊆ y ∈ M → x ∈ M . In the context of Zermelo set theory, we take
the foundation axiom in the form of the ∈-induction scheme, which is equivalent
over Z to the “transitive containment” assertion that every set is an element of a
transitive set.
The importance of the theorem is that Mathias explains how to construct a great
variety of fruitful classes TQ,G, defined in terms of a function Q : ω → Vω and a
family G of functions from ω to ω, which specify rates of growth for the allowed
sets. Namely, a transitive x is in TQ,G just in case its rate-of-growth function
fQx (n) = |x ∩Q(n)|
is in G. Under general hypotheses, he proves, TQ,G is fruitful.
For our application, it will suffice to consider one of his key examples, described
in [Mat01, §3]. Namely, we consider the case of TR,F , where R(n) = Vn is the
rank-initial segment function and F is the collection of functions f bounded by one
of the superexponential functions bk of the form
bk : n 7→ 2
2·
·
·
2n }
k
for some k ∈ ω. Mathias proves in this instance that TR,F is fruitful, and therefore
by theorem 24 the class M =
⋃
TR,F is a supertransitive model of Zermelo set
theory. The elements of M are precisely those sets x whose transitive closure has
a rate of growth in Vn bounded by some bk.
x ∈M ⇐⇒ ∃k ∀n |TC({x}) ∩ Vn| ≤ bk(n).
Since each bk has a fixed superexponential depth k, it follows that each of them has
strictly slower asymptotic growth than the full tetration function
n 7→ |Vn| = 2
2·
·
·
2 }
n− 1,
and therefore the set Vω is not inM because it grows too quickly, [Mat01, thm. 3.8].
In order to prove the claims of theorem 23, we shall show that the original ZF
model 〈V,∈〉 is bi-interpretable with the Zermelo model 〈M,∈〉 defined by M =⋃
TR,F above. We already have one direction of the interpretation, since we have
definedM as a transitive inner model inside V . The difficult part will be conversely
to provide an interpretation of 〈V,∈〉 inside 〈M,∈〉. For this, we shall make use of
the Zermelo tower hierarchy, defined for any set a in V as follows:
(1) V
(a)
0 = ∅;
(2) V
(a)
α+1 = {a} ∪
(
P (V
(a)
α )− {∅}
)
, for successor ordinals;
(3) V
(a)
λ =
⋃
α<λ
V
(a)
α , for limit ordinals λ.
Mathias had introduced the Zermelo tower idea in [Mat01, §4], but defined and
considered it only at finite stages and ω, whereas we continue the construction,
crucially, through all the ordinals. Our reason for doing so is that the full Zermelo
tower V (a) is a definable copy of the original universe, as we prove here:
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Lemma 25. For any set a, the universe 〈V,∈〉 is definably isomorphic to the full
Zermelo tower
〈
V (a),∈
〉
.
Proof. The isomorphism from V to V (a) is simply the operation replacing every
hereditary instance of ∅ in a set with a. Specifically, we define the replacing
operation x 7→ x(a) as follows:
∅(a) = a.
x(a) = {y(a) | y ∈ x}
A simple argument by transfinite induction now shows that this is an isomorphism
of every Vα with V
(a)
α , which establishes the theorem. 
Next, we show that for suitable sets a, the Zermelo tower is contained within
the Zermelo universe M we defined above.
Lemma 26. If a is any infinite transitive set in M , then V (a) ⊆M .
Proof. Suppose that a is an infinite transitive set in M . It therefore obeys the
growth rate requirement, and so there is some k for which |a∩Vn| ≤ bk(n) for every
n. Notice that a ∪ V
(a)
α is a transitive set, and since (i) u(a) is infinite for every set
u, and (ii) every element of Vn is hereditarily finite, it follows that
(a ∪ V (a)α ) ∩ Vn = a ∩ Vn.
Consequently, a∪ V
(a)
α obeys the growth-rate requirement, and consequently every
V
(a)
α is in M . So V (a) ⊆M . 
Lemma 27. For any set a ∈M , the class V (a) is definable in M from parameter a.
Proof. One might naturally want to define V (a) in M by transfinite recursion, as
we did in defining the hierarchy V
(a)
α above. The problem with this is that M
is a model merely of Zermelo set theory, in which such definitions by transfinite
recursion do not necessarily succeed. Nevertheless, in instances as here where we
know independently that the recursion does have a solution in M , the recursive
definition does in fact succeed in defining it.
But instead of that definition, let us consider another simple definition. Define
that a terminal ∈-descent from a set x is a finite ∈-descending sequence of sets
from x to ∅
x = xn ∋ xn−1 ∋ · · · ∋ x1 ∋ x0 = ∅.
We claim that V (a) consists in M precisely of those sets x for which every terminal
∈-descent passes through the set a, in the sense that a = xi for some i. Certainly
every x ∈ V (a) is like this, since if y ∈ x ∈ V
(a)
α+1, then either x = a or y ∈ V
(a)
α , and
by induction the terminal descents from y will pass through a. Conversely, assume
that every terminal ∈-descent from x passes through a. So either x = a, in which
case it is in V (a), or else the assumption about terminal descents is also true of the
elements of x. By ∈-induction, therefore, the elements of x are all in V (a), and this
implies that x is in V
(a)
γ at an ordinal stage γ beyond the stages where the elements
of x are placed into V (a). 
If we take a = ω, or some other definable infinite transitive set in M , then we
don’t need a as a parameter, and so we’ve proved that 〈V,∈〉 and 〈M,∈〉 are at
least mutually interpretable; each has a definable copy in the other.
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Lemma 28. The mutual interpretation of 〈V,∈〉 and 〈M,∈〉 is a bi-interpretation.
Proof. We’ve seen already that M is a definable transitive inner model of V , and
〈V,∈〉 is definably isomorphic to its copy
〈
V (a),∈
〉
in M , isomorphic by the map
x 7→ x(a), which is definable in V , assuming as we have that we use a = ω or some
other definable infinite transitive set in M .
Conversely, we’ve seen thatM can define the model
〈
V (a),∈
〉
. Inside that model,
we define the copy M (a) of M , just as M is definable in V . For this to be a bi-
interpretation, we need to show that the isomorphism ofM withM (a) is definable in
M . This isomorphism is precisely the function i : x 7→ x(a), applied to x ∈M . The
problem again, however, is that M is not able in general to undertake recursive
definitions, since it satisfies only Zermelo set theory, which does not prove that
recursive definitions have solutions. Nevertheless, we claim that i ↾ x ∈ M for any
x ∈ M . The reason is that the transitive closure of i ↾ x = { (y, y(a)) | y ∈ x } can
be seen to obey the growth-rate requirement, as x does with its transitive closure
and the sets y(a) are either a or have no elements in any Vn, as in lemma 26 above.
Thus,M can see the isomorphism i ↾ x of 〈x,∈〉 with
〈
x(a),∈
〉
for any set x ∈M . If
x is transitive, then since transitive sets are rigid, this isomorphism is unique, and
since different transitive sets are never isomorphic, 〈x,∈〉 will not be isomorphic to
any 〈y,∈〉 that M (a) thinks is transitive. So M can define i ↾ x for transitive sets
x by the assertions that it is an isomorphism of 〈x,∈〉 with a set 〈y,∈〉 for a set y
that M (a) thinks is transitive. These maps all agree with and union up to the full
isomorphism x 7→ x(a) of M with M (a), which is therefore definable in M . So we
have a bi-interpretation of 〈V,∈〉 with 〈M,∈〉. 
Let us now put all this together and explain how we have proved theorem 23.
Proof of theorem 23. The argument we have given shows that every model V |= ZF
is bi-interpretable with a transitive inner model M of Zermelo set theory, which is
not a model of ZF, because it does not even have Vω as an element. This establishes
statement (2) of theorem 23.
For statement (1), we can perform the construction inside a well-founded model
of some sufficient fragment of ZF. For example, let us undertake the entire con-
struction inside some Vλ, satisfying Σ2-collection, say. We thereby get a transitive
model Mλ ⊆ Vλ of Zermelo set theory, without Vω, but with 〈Vλ,∈〉 and 〈Mλ,∈〉
bi-interpretable. So there are well-founded models of Zermelo set theory that are
bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic.
Finally, let us consider statement (3). We consider the two extensions of Zermelo
set theory describing the situation that enabled us to make the main example for
statement (2). That is, the first theory is ZF itself; and the second theory, which
we denote ZM, asserts Zermelo set theory Z, plus the assertion that the class V (ω),
defined as in our main argument, is a model of ZF, and the assertion that M is
isomorphic to M (ω) inside that class by the isomorphism definition we provided.
These two theories are different, but the argument that we gave above for the
models shows that they are bi-interpretable. 
Let us close this section by mentioning that the construction is quite malleable
with respect to the instance of replacement we want to eliminate. Alternative
versions of the construction will construct supertransitive inner models M that
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satisfy Zermelo set theory, and which have Vα as a set for every ordinal α < λ, but
do not have Vλ as a set.
Theorem 29. For every limit ordinal λ, the universe 〈V,∈〉 is bi-interpretable with
a transitive inner model 〈M,∈〉 satisfying Zermelo set theory with foundation, such
that Vα ∈M for every α < λ, but Vλ /∈M .
Proof. We useM =
⋃
TQ,G, where Q : λ→ Vλ is Q(α) = Vα, and G consists of the
functions f that are bounded by one of the functions bβ, for some β < λ, defined
by
(1) b0(α) = α;
(2) bβ+1(α) = 2
bβ(α);
(3) if η is a limit ordinal, then bη(α) = supβ<η bβ(α).
This is defined with cardinal arithmetic, not ordinal arithmetic. The class TQ,G
consists of all transitive sets x whose rate-of-growth functions
fQx (α) = |x ∩ Vα|
is bounded by one of the functions bβ, for some β < λ. It follows that T
Q,G
is a fruitful class, and the resulting Zermelo model M =
⋃
TQ,G is a transitive
inner model of Zermelo set theory with foundation (in the form of the ∈-induction
scheme). Every Vα for α < λ is in M , with growth rate bounded by bα, but Vλ is
not in M , since this growth rate exceeds any given bβ for fixed β < λ. And 〈V,∈〉
is bi-interpretable with 〈M,∈〉 by analogous arguments to the above. 
One can use this idea to produce many non-tight theories extending Zermelo
set theory. For example, for any theory true in the model M that we produced in
the proof of theorem 23 will be bi-interpretable with ZF. For example, that model
M satisfies the principle that every definable function from a set to the ordinals is
bounded, which can be seen as a weak form of replacement not provable in Z, but
true in M precisely because it is a transitive inner model (with all the ordinals) of
a model of ZF. In theorem 29 we similarly arranged that Vα exists for all α up to
some large definable limit ordinal λ, which is itself another instance of replacement,
and so this gives another extension of Zermelo set theory that is bi-interpretable
with ZF.
Let us conclude the paper by distinguishing the theory form of bi-interpretation
from a natural model-by-model form of bi-interpretation that might hold for the
models of the theory. Specifically, we define that
Definition 30. Theories T1 and T2 are model-by-model bi-interpretable if every
model of one of the theories is bi-interpretable with a model of the other.
The definition in effect drops the uniformity requirement for bi-interpretability
of theories, since it could be a different interpretation that works in one model
than in another, with perhaps no uniform definition that works in all models of the
theory. This is precisely what we should like now to prove.
Theorem 31. There are theories T1 and T2 that are model-by-model bi-interpretable,
but not bi-interpretable.
Proof. Consider the theories
(1) T1 = ZF.
(2) T2 = {α ∨ β | α ∈ ZF ∧ β ∈ ZM}. (That is, T2 = ZM ∨ ZF)
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where ZM is the theory used in the proof of theorem 23. Observe that M |= T2 if
and only if M |= ZF or M |= ZM. The reverse implication is immediate, and if the
latter fails, then M 6|= α and M 6|= β for some α ∈ ZF and β ∈ ZM, which would
mean M 6|= α ∨ β, violating the former.
Now observe simply that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with itself, of
course, and this is a model of T2. And conversely, every model of T2 is either a
model of ZF already, or else a model of ZM, which is bi-interpretable with a model
of ZF. So these two theories are model-by-model bi-interpretable.
Let us now prove that the theories are not bi-interpretable. Suppose toward
contradiction that they are, that (I, J) forms a bi-interpretation, so that I defines
a model of T1 inside any model of T2 and J defines a model of T2 inside any model of
T1, and the theories prove this and furthermore have definable isomorphisms of the
original models with their successive double-interpreted copies. LetM be a model of
ZM that is not a model of ZF. Let IM be the interpreted model of ZF defined inside
M . This is also a model of ZM, since ZM ⊆ ZF, and so we may use I again to define
II
M
to get another model of ZF inside that model. Because we interpreted a model
of T2 by I, it follows that I
IM and IM are bi-interpretable as models. But these
are both models of ZF, and so by theorem 13 they are isomorphic. By interpreting
with J to get the corresponding interpreted ZM models, it follows that JI
IM
and
JI
M
are isomorphic. Because (I, J) form a bi-interpretation, the first of these is
isomorphic to IM , which is a ZF model, while the second is isomorphic toM , which
is not. This is a contradiction, and so the theories are not bi-interpretable. 
The essence of the proof was that we had a theory ZM that was not solid, but
it was a subtheory of a solid theory ZF, with which it was bi-interpretable.
10. Final remarks
We have investigated the nature of mutual and bi-interpretation in set theory
and the models of set theory. There is surely a vibrant mutual interpretation phe-
nomenon in set theory, with numerous instances of mutual interpretation amongst
diverse natural extensions of ZF set theory. This mutual-interpretation phenome-
non, however, is less than fully robust in several respects. First, theories extending
ZF are never bi-interpretable, and indeed, there cannot be even a single nontrivial
instance of models of ZF set theory being bi-interpretable. Worse, amongst the
well-founded models of ZF, there cannot even be nontrivial instances of mutual
interpretation. The basic lesson of this is that, when one follows the mutual in-
terpretations we mentioned above, there is no getting back. One cannot recover
the original model. When you move from a well-founded model of ZFC with large
cardinals to the corresponding determinacy model, you cannot define a copy of the
original model again, and the same when interpreting in the other direction. In
this sense, interpretation in models of set theory inevitably involves and requires
the loss of set-theoretic information.
Meanwhile, we have showed that several natural weak set theories avoid this
phenomenon, including Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC− without the power set
axiom and Zermelo set theory Z. It remains open just how strong the weak set
theories can be, while still admitting non-trivial instances of bi-interpretation. In
addition, there remain interesting open questions concerning the circumstances in
which Hω1 and Hω2 might be bi-interpretable or bi-interpretation synonymous.
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